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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of lJtah 
.JUNE SINGLETON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs 
GEORGF~ V. ALEXANDER and 
"WILLIAM J. GREEN, a copartnership 
dllJ!a Carefree Laundry. 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries resulting 
from paintiff slipping and falling in defendants place 
of business known as Carefree Laundry. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants motion for summary judgment dis-
mis8ing case granted and Court found as a matter of 
law plaintiff was ''contributorily negligent" and defend-
ants were not negligent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff 8eeks reversal of judgment dismissing 
[Jlaintiff'8 ca8e, and judgment in her favor as a matter 
of law, or that failing, remanding case to lower Court 
for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about N ovemher 14, 19G3, plaintiff entered 
the Self-Service Laundromat owned by the defendants 
at the corner of 25th Street and .Monroe Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah. This was the first time she had been in 
the Laundromat (Deposition, Page 4, Lines 13 and 14.) 
She entered the prerni~.;es with her clothes in a clothes 
basket, and in company with her daughter (Deposition, 
Page 5, Lines 16 and 17), and according to plaintiff 
between 11 :00 o'clock A.M., and 1 :00 o'clock P.M. on 
the 14th, (Deposition, Page 6, Line 30, and Page 7, 
Lines 1, 2, 5). Plaintiff indicated that at the time she 
entered the premises she noticed a small area with water 
on it to the South part of the building near the rest-
room and office floors; that it looked like just a little 
spill1 not even two feet round (Deposition, Page 12, Lines 
9 through 30). This area was not near the pathway 
taken by plaintiff from the time she entered the prem-
ises until she left (Defendants Exhibit No. 1). 
After plaintiff had dried her clothes she folded 
the same, put them in the basket, and lt~ft the premises 
by the same route that she had entered the same. As 
she made a turn to the right, turning toward the door, 
she suddenly felt water on her feet, and before she 
could do anything about it slipped and fell, causing 
the injuries complained of. (Deposition, Page 9, Lines 
22-26; Page 16, Lines 1 to 30. See also defendants 
Exhibit No. 1). 
The plaintiff further testified that the water covered 
so much of the t'tore front that she could not walk out 
without going 1 ltrough thi:.;, as slw determined later 
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(See Deposition, Page 20, Lines 21-25. She also testi-
fied (Deposition p. 20, Lines 18 through 24) that water 
was running out the door by the time the police arrived. 
The Plaintiff also stated that she was looking ahead 
as she was walking out of the Laundromat (See 
Deposition, Page 22, Lines 10 through 23). She also 
explained that the reason she was not paying strict 
attention to where her feet were being placed was that 
she had gone over this floor just a few minutes earlier 
an the floor was dry. She also explained that she 
had the basket in her arms, a circumstance reason-
ably foreseeable by any opemtor of a Laundromat. 
Plaintiff testified further that a drain existed very near 
the water. (Deposition, Page 11, Lines 8-11). 
The affidavit of Wilma Alexander admits that the 
premises were left unattended for a period of time dur-
ing which the accident occurred. (Defendant's Affi-
davit, Page 4). The Affidavit alleges that it is not 
customary in the self-service laundry business for the 
premises to be attended at all times. (Defendant's Affi-
davit, Page 4). Mrs. Alexander also stated in her 
Affidavit that leaving the premises unattended was 
justifiable in light of the fact that the premises had a 
telephone with her number listed on a card near it. 
(Defendant's Affidavit, Page 6). Yet, in the Answers 
to Interrogatories submitted by defendant, it was aa-
mitted that there was no telephone on the premises on 
November 14, 1963. (Answers to Interrogatories No. 
14). 
Nothing has been introduced by the defendant to 
rfo;pute that the floor was covered with water, nor has 
defendant introduced any information that the water on 
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the floor was being properly eliminated by the drain 
installed on defendant's premises. Defendant's Affi-
davit (Page 8) states that Mrs. Alexander discovered 
that the toilet had overflowed but defendant has intro-
duced no evidence that the over-flow from this toilet 
had caused or even that it was capable of causing, the 
extensive inundation which existed on the premises. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED REJEcrrING PLAIN-
TIFF'S CONTENTION THAT THE CASE FELL 
WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUI-
TUR. 
With respect to plaintiff's contention that the Com-
plaint is one involving Res Ipsa Loquitur, the Court 
should be advised that the wording used in the Complaint 
is the same wording basically as the case of W clch vs. 
Sears Roebcck Company, 96 CA. 2d 553, 215 Pac. 2d 796. 
In the Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine, the facts or circum-
stances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise 
a presumption or at least permit an inference of negli-
gence on the part of defendant. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the cases as to 
what constitutes the rule of Res Ipsa Loquitur is that 
proof that the thing which caused the injury to the plain-
tiff was under the control and management of the defend-
ant, and the occurence was such as in the ordinary 
course of things would not happen, if those who had 
its control or management used proper care, together, 
afford sufficient evidence, or as stated by some Courts 
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reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the 
defendant, that the injury arose from, or was caused by 
the defendants' want of care. See 38Am. Jur. Negli-
gence, Sec. 295, P. 989. It has been held that the phrase 
"Res Ipsa Loquitur" as a symbol for the rule that the 
fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the sur-
rounding circumstances may permit an inference of 
culpability on the part of the defendant, makes plain-
tiff's a prima facie case, and presents a question of fact 
for the defendant to meet with an explanation. The 
facts in the instant case are that plaintiff came into 
the premises owned by the defendants, and under the 
control of the defendants, and when leaving stepped in 
water from an unknown source, and under circumstances 
that ordinarily do not exist. She has no way of deter-
mining where the water came from and what care had 
been exercised in preventing this water from being on 
the floor. In her inert condition she is not to be ex-
pected to inspect the premis·es immediately and attempt 
to determine what caused the situation. In 38 Am. Jur., 
Negligence, Sec. 297, P. 993, the Rule is stated further as 
follows: "In a situation to which Res Ipsa Loquitur, as 
a distinctive rule applies, there is no evidence, circum-
stantial or otherwise, at least none of sufficient proba-
tive value to show negligence apart from the postulate, 
which rests on common experience and not on the specific 
ci reumstance:s of the instant case, that physical causes 
of the kind which produced the accident in question 
do not ordinarilyy exist in the absence of negligence, 
that is, in the absence of a breach of duty, such as de-
fendant owed plaintiff." 
In Section 299 under the same citation, the text 
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further 8tates ''Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine is based, 
in part, upon the theory that the defom1ant in eharge of 
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows 
the cause of the acci<lent, or has best opportunity of 
ascertaining it, and that plaintiff has no such know-
ledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence 
in general terms, and to rely upon proof of the happen-
ing of the accident in order to establish negligence." 
In the case at bar plaintiff was a business invitee 
to defendant's Laundromat. The Laundromat was sud-
denly inundated, and the water was not eliminated by 
the drainage system in the establishment. This set 
of circumstances does not ordinarily exist in the absenre 
of negligence in the installation and manitenance of the 
plumbing and drainage system. 'rhese circumstances 
were a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The 
plumbing and drainage systems of defendants' estab-
lishment were entirely in the control of defendants, and 
therefore defendants are in the best position to ascer-
tain the cause of the inundation and the failure of the 
drain properly to eliminate the problem. Plaintiff has 
no knowledge as to the plumbing in defendants' estab-
lishment and therefore is eornpelled to allege negli-
gence in general terms. Upon this set of facts plain-
tiff submits that the dostrine of Res I spa Loquitur ap-
plies. 
If that doctrine applies, then the Court below erred 
in granting a summary judgment based upon a finding 
that defendants were not negligent. Once the doctrine 
of Res Ipsa Loquitur obtains, it then becomes the de-
fendant's burden to refute a presumption of negligence. 
We submit that that burden could not be sustained 
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merely by submission of an affidavit of defendant's be-
lief that the negligence was caused by over-flow from 
a toilet stuffed with paper by an unknown person. But, 
in the case at bar no such affidavit has even been pre-
sented. Defendant's affidavit merely states that the 
toilet over-flowed through no fault of the management, 
and supplies no causal connection between that over-
flow and the extensive flooding of the premises. n 
does not even state the affiant's belief that there was 
such a causal connection. Supplying such a causal con-
nection is a jury function, and as the suit now stands 
there is no evidence at all bearing upon this issue. 
The Res Ispa Loquitur doctrine has been applied 
in a number of cases similar to the instant case. See 
Knowles vs. Hillside Lounge, Inc., 137 NW 2d 361, a 
Nebraska case in 1965, where a collapsing stool or chair 
was held to be a Res Ipsa Loquitur situation. 
See Bell & Koch, Inc. vs. Stanley, 375 SW. 2d 696, 
a Kentucky case in 1964; a stack of dry-wall materials 
fell upon plaintiff, and plaintiff testified he did nothing 
to cause the sheets to fall. Doctrine applied. See Barca 
vs. Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc., 256 NYS 2d. 14, a 
Supreme Court decision in New York in 1965, where the 
Court held that the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur ap-
plied, in the case where a supermarket customer fell on 
loose sugar in the isle. The Court went on further to 
~tate that the use of Res Ipsa Loquitur is not foreclosed 
by plaintiff's having pleaded a specific act of negli-
gence. See Sanone vs. J. C. Penney Co., 404 Pac. 2d 248, 
a Utah case in 1965, where the Court affirmed a jury 
verdict for plaintiff, and stated that Res Ipsa Loquitur 
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applied to plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff, a two and one-
half-year-old girl caught her foot in an escalator while 
descending with her mother. For similar cases see 66 
ALR 2d. 496. 
It is our contention that Res Loquitur does in fact 
apply in the instant case where plaintiff came upon 
the premises and encountered a situation not ordinarily 
anticipated in such a location. The premises were owned 
and operated by defendants, and under their control 
and as stated hereinabove, plaintiff had no method of 
determining the source of the water and had no reason 
to anticipate that water would suddenly flood over a 
large part of the floor of the Laundromat. An affidavit 
certainly could not be held to constitute legal evidence 
binding upon the Court and plaintiff, that the water 
came from any certain spot and that the defendants were 
not negligent in the maintenance of the premises; and 
in the case at bar the affidavit of defendant does not 
even go so far as to allege these items. 
The Rule is that it is the duty of a store owner to 
use reasonable care, ordinary or due care, to make and 
keep the premises reasonably safe for business invitees 
to use; 162 ALR. 950 et seq. This is a question of 
fact to be determined by the jury. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AS A 
MATTER O:B1 LAW DE.FENDANTS WERE NOT 
NEGLIGENT. 
Plaintiff contends that the depositions and affi-
davits befon'\ the Court establish two bases upon which 
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a jury might find defendants negligent: First, defend-
ants admit that their establishment was left unattended, 
but contend that this was the custom for those engaged 
in the business of running a Laundromat. Plaintiff 
submits that merely stating this in an affidavit does not 
establish it as so. It is an opinion of a defendant who 
is not established, by affidavit or otherwise, as having 
the appropriate expertise to render a competent opin-
ion on this matter; nor has plaintiff had the opportun-
ity, through voir dire, to test the affiant's expertise. 
But even if it were established that this was a standard 
procedure in the Laundromat business, a jury need not 
conclude that such a business custom met the standard of 
care which a business man owes a business invitee; 
See Ramsey v. Mellon National Bank & Trust Co., 
251 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. Pa. 1966 and Calligan v. City 
of Monongahela, 115 Atl. 869 (Pa. 1922). 
The second basis upon which a jury might find the 
defendants negligent lies in the construction and main-
tenance of the plumbing and drainage system of the 
premises. 
Plaintiff has contended in her first argument that 
the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur should work to allow 
the establishment of a prima facie case that defendants 
were negligent in this regard. But even if that doctrine 
does not so operate, plaintiff submits that enough pro-
bative evidence could be adduced to support such a con-
tention. First, the bathroom had no drain. Second, 
the drain in the main room did not eliminate the hazard 
even though the water coursed by it. Third, the Depo-
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sition (Page 15, Line 5) indicates that evidence exists 
which would lead to the conclusion that the water came 
from the plumbing beneath the toilet instead of, or in 
addition to, the water which came from an over-flow. 
Each of these items, if proved, would be a proper basis 
for a jury to find the defendants negligent in the con-
struction or maintenance of the premises. Against 
these items defendants have introduced evidence only 
that the toilet bowl was clogged and had overflowed. 
They have offered no evidence that this over-flow cre-
ated the extensive hazard which caused plaintiff's in-
JUry. 
Many recent cases have determined the more en-
lightened view concerning negligence. See New 
man vs. United States, 248 F. Supp. 699 a DC case in 
1965, where plaintiff fell in a hole in a walkway lead-
ing away from Washington ~Ionument. Evidence in-
dicated that a water line beneath the walkway had been 
negligently installed, and that water was leaking out 
around joint causing a sudden collapse of the ground 
under the walkway. Held: Award judgment to plaintiff. 
Negligent installation of pipe was proximate cause of 
accident. See Robinson vs. Parkcent Apts., 248 Federal 
Supplement, 632. In this case the hotel had a crew of 
men clearing away the snow from the approach to the 
hotel. At 9 :45 P.M., the work stopped. When plaintiff 
arrived shortly after midnight he slipped and fell on 
glare ice covering sidewalk and path. It was held in 
this matter that the award to plaintiff was proper, and 
the Court stated that it was negligent to stop work that 
had continued all day, and to take no precaution for late 
arrivals. 
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See Control Hardware Company vs. Statler, 180 
So. 2d. 205, a Florida Appellate case, 1965' were the 
defendant store owner placed a mat on a sidewalk in 
front of store, and plaintiff tripped on it and fell. Held: 
Affirming jury verdict for plaintiff. Where abutting 
owner creates a servitude on sidewalk he has a duty to 
servitude from becoming a nuisance. This would be 
analogous to the present case, where either the improper 
installation or condition of the toilet, or the failure to 
place a drain in the bathroom would be enough to cre-
ate a servitude for it to be negligent. 
See Moore vs. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 173, So. 2d 
603, a Mississippi case, 1965, where there was evidence of 
presence of dried banana peel on said Supermarket 
floor, despite floor inspection two hours earlier ;Held: 
that the evidence raised submissible issues for the jury 
as to the defendant's negligence. See also Guidani vs. 
Cumerlato, 207 NE 2d 1, Illinois Appellate case, 1965. 
A foreign substance was on the floor case, where the 
bowler in a Bowling Alley went to the restroom and his 
shoes got wet as the floor was wet. When he returned 
to bowling his shoes stuck to the floor, and he fell. The 
Court here held it was error to grant defendants judg-
ment n.o.v., after verdict for plaintiff. 
The Court in this case said the defendant was under 
duty "to prevent their patrons from getting liquid sub-
stance on the soles of their shoes." A case almost ex-
actly in point with the present case. 
See Harvey Building, Inc. vs. Haley, 175 So. 2d. 
780, a Florida case in 1965, where the plaintiff upon 
entering the lobby of defendant's office building during 
rain, slipped and fell on slick floor; held reversing 
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Summary Judgment for defendant, Affidavits of plain-
tiff's witnesses that floor was wet and slippery, and 
that plaintiff was observed on the floor sufficient fo 
raise submissible issue as to occupier's negligence. See 
also Murphy vs. El Dorado Bowling, Inc., 407 Pac. za. 
57, Arizona Appellate case, 1965. The premises in this 
case was shown by the evidence to have a walkway 
adjacent to the last lane, which was lower than the 
lane. and the bowler watching his ball, started to take 
a step with his left foot, slipped over the drop-off 
causing him to fall and break his leg; held reversing 
directed verdict for defendant; jury could properly 
find that recesssed walkway constituted negligence on 
the part of the bowling alley operator. The mere fact 
that condition of premises is open and obvious, does 
not necessarily mean that condition is not unreason-
ably dangerous. Occupier may be liable to his invitees 
for harm from "open and obvious conditions, where he 
should anticipate harm despite his knowledge .of obvious-
ness." In this case before the Bar defendants claim 
that plaintiff should have seen the open and obvious 
danger from the water, even though she was carrying 
a basket customarily which in some way blocked her 
view. The case is further in point with our present 
case, i. e., the Court held the jury could find the con-
dition of the premises was such that negligence could 
be found, and this, of course, is plaintiff's contention in 
the present case before the Court, that the maintenance 
of the bathroom was such that negligence could be found 
by the jury. 
See also, G. E. vs. Salcidio, 408 P. 2d 42, an Arizona 
Appellate case in 1965: In this case the Court found the 
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plaintiff does not have to prove actual or constructive 
notice of defective floor condition, where defect is cre-
ated by defendant or his servants. Once again this is 
a analogous to the case before the Court, where plain-
tiff claims that defendants noted the dangerous con-
ditions in the bathroom, where in fact, the water was 
coming up around the base of the toilet, or the fact that 
no drain was presented permitted the water to come 
through the remaining traversed part of the Laundro-
mat. 
See also, 6lALR. 2d 62, Harper & James Torts, 
1073-75; 1487, 1488: See Prossor Torts 402, 3d Ed. 
1964. See Garrett vs. American Air Lines, Inc. 332 Fed. 
2d 939 (5th Cir. 1964). Plaintiff was injured when she 
stumbled over a small zipper bag put on the floor near a 
gate in the waiting room and sued the air carrier for neg-
ligance in not providing a safe place for passengers to 
wait. In reversing a directed verdict for defendant, 
the Court held it is a submissible issue for the jury to 
determine whether air carrier must anticipate likli-
hood that the manner in which passengers handle hand 
baggage would cause injury to fellow passengers. The 
Court stated that a carrier must reasonably take cog-
nizance of the customs and habits and practices fol-
lowed generally by its passengers insofar as these act-
ions present hazards to its business invitees, and with 
awareness of these hazards it must take reasonably ap-
propriate steps to avoid or minimize liklihood of harm. 
This would be applicable in the present case, where a 
jury must determine whether or not customers would 
be carrying baskets, which might hamper their vision, 
and whether the customers would be likely to use the 
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bathroom in such a manner as to cause the toilet to 
over-flow, and with this in mind the defendants would 
then be under the care to take reasonable steps to avoid 
any dangerous condition. 
Along the same line, with respect to the owner's 
liability to anticipate acts of third parties, see Den-
isewich vs. Pappas 198 A. 2d 144, a Rhode Island case 
in 1964; the plaintiffs' rt>staurant patrons, were injured 
when a car operated in defendant-restaurant's parking 
lot broke through the wall of the restaurant adjacent 
to the booth. There was no adequate barrier between 
the parking lot, and the building. The Court here heia 
that it was a question of fact whether the defendant was 
under a duty to erect adequate barrier. The Court 
stated that where a third person's intervening act could 
have been first seen or anticipated as natural and prob-
able result of the original negligence, the chain of 
causation was not broken, and applying this Rule to 
our present case, the jury could find that defendants 
have, or should have fors0en or anticipated the pub-
lic use of toilet facilities, and possibly flooding of the 
same, if this in fact did occur. See Bozza vs. Varnado, 
Inc., 43 N.J. 355, 200 A. 2d 777, a New Jersey case in 
1964, where plaintiff fell on a cafeteria floor, and proved 
that the defendant was very busy, supplied no lids on 
beverage containers, did not require the use of trays, 
and the floor was littered, which circumstances, accord-
ing to the Court, were held to make that a prima facie 
case, and stated that when plaintiff's circumstances 
were such as to create rPasonable probility that a 
dangerous condition would occur he need not prove 
occupier's actual or constructive notice thereof. The 
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Court further held: "Concept of actual or constructive 
notice has been given undue emphasis in our decision." 
The case of Mahoney vs. J. C. Penney Company, 
377 Pac. 2d., 663, a New Mexico case decided in 1962, 
found likewise, where plaintiff fell down on the stair-
way of the store, the Court held that plaintiff's recovery 
was warranted though proof of actual, or constructive 
knowledge was absent, and that actual or constructive 
knowledge of specific foreign substance or length of 
time it was present need not be proved where dangerous 
condition is not isolated, but is foreseeable because of 
pattern of conduct, recurring, general condition, or 
continuing condition. Once again this is analogous to 
the case before this Court, where the condition of the 
plumbing and drainage system was such that the injury 
or conditions causing the injury were reasonably fore-
seeable. 
In 38 Am. Jur. Sec. 30, P. 677, the Rule is stated as 
follows: 
"The standard by which the conduct of a person 
in a particular situation is judged in determin-
ing whether he was negligent, is the care which 
an ordinary prudent person would exercise under 
like circumstances." 
and this particular rule, ordinarily, is to be followed 
by a jury determining the presence or lack of negli-
gence or contributory negligence, but is not a question 
of law. 
POINT III. 
rl1HE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLI-
G FJNT. 
15 
Plaintiff contends that defendants knew or should 
know in the ordinary course of business, customers are 
going to come into the store carrying containers and 
oftentimes large baskets of clothing, and that this factor 
is one that must be considered in using reasonable care 
to provide reasonably safe premises for such traffic. 
Indeed, the business of the defendants relies upon custo-
mers entering and leaving with large bundles in their 
arms. With this jn mind, plaintiff submits there can 
be no question but what we have a jury question as to 
whether or not defendants had the premises in such a 
condition as it would reasonably require for the safety 
of its patrons, and the further question as to whether 
or not plaintiff was using reasonable care in her in-
gress and egress from the building. In this case, the 
Court cannot say, without the taking of evidence, t~at 
either one of the parties, plaintiff or defendants, were 
not negligent as a matter of law. See Kreiss vs. Altuna 
Laundry, Inc. 133 So. 2d 602, a Georgia case, 1963, 
where the Court held; "Whether it was reasonable for 
plaintiff to use the only method of egress from flat 
under the circumstances, and whether she was reason-
ably careful was for the jury to determine." This is 
where the plaintiff left the premises, testifying, "It was 
pitch-black" and where the plaintiff had previously tra-
versed the area. See also Safeway Stores, Inc. vs. Step-
hens. 197 A. 2d 849, a 1964 case of Washington, D. C. 
Appellate Court, where the Court held; "Plaintiff was 
not necessarjly negligent in stepping through debris. 
Whether she was exercising a degree of care commensu-
rate with the known circumstances was a question upon 
which reasonable minds could disagree. Therefore, a 
jury question was presented." In this ease, plaintiff 
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admittedly was in a hurry because the store was about 
to close, and walked across the isle, knowing vetetable 
debris was on a dirty floor. See also Dever vs. Theriot's, 
Inc., 159 So. 2d 602, a Louisiana case in 1964, where 
the plaintiff-customer fell on lettuce, the Court held that 
the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, 
and it not necessary to make a specific observation of 
floor conditions before taking each step. See also Gar-
garo Foley vs. Salesianurn School, Inc., 208 A. 2d. 308, 
Deleware Supreme Court Case, 1965, where the Court 
held that plaintiff could not be said to be guilty of 
contributory negligence, or assumption of risk, as a 
matter of law, where question existed as to her apprecia-
tion of degree of risk under poor lighting conditions. 
In this case, plaintiff slipped and fell in a school parking 
lot after leaving school, where she had been playing 
bingo. Plaintjff had been at school about once a week 
for a year and knew of mounds and poor lighting. See 
Robinson vs. Parkcent Apts., 248 Federal Supplement 
632, DDC., 1965. In this case defendant had a crew of 
men clearing away snow on the approach to the hotel. 
At 9 :45 P.M. the work stopped. When plaintiff arrived 
shortly after Midnight he slipped and fell on glare ice 
covering a sidewalk and pa th. Held: A warding judg-
ment to plaintiff. It was negligent to stop work that 
had continued all day, and to take no precautions for 
late arrivals. Plaintiff was not under duty as a matter 
of law to look at street before leaving the taxi, and not 
guilty of contributory negligence in stepping onto icy 
walk. Since plaintiff required to use both public side-
walk and path to reach hotel, hotel would be liable 
whether fall occurred on sidewalk or hotel property. 
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See Blackburn vs. T01nbling, 407 Pac. 2d. 337, a Colo-
rado case, in 1965, where the hotel door swung out-
ward immediately on to a four and one-half inch step, 
plaintiff who had just entered the hotel, went hack 
out and fell down over step; held a verdict for plain-
tiff, evidence supported finding that a person in exer-
cise of due care could fail to observe step down. 
The case cited by defendants in support of their 
contributory negligence allegation, are, as is obvious, 
old cases, not in point, and at the present time not 
good law. The Courts have recently all indicated that 
a question of negligence, and contributory negligence 
are questions of ultimate fact, which should be de-
termined by the jury, after all available evidence is 
sumbitted to it. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS AND 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF A11 TIME OF PRE-TRIAL. 
With respect to Summary Judgments, our Supreme 
Court of Utah, in the case of Brandt vs. Springville 
Banking Coniz)any, 10 Utah 2d., 350, 353 Pac. 2d 460, held 
that a Summary Judgment prevents litigants from 
fully presenting their ease to the Court; Courts are 
and should be reluctant to invoke this remedy. 
In a further case, Bidlack vs. Deseret Dodge Truck 
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 Pac. 2d. 559, 561, the 
Court stated: 
"A Summary .Judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admi~sions, and inferences which when 
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viewed in the light most favorable to the loser 
show that, 'there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact, and that the losing party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law'." 
The Court went on further to say; 
"Such showing must preclude all reasonable pos-
sibility that the loser could, if given a trial, pro-
duce evidence which would reasonably sustain 
a judgment in his favor." 
Under these rulings plaintiff should be given the 
opportunity to present evidence to show that defend-
ants were negligent since nothing has been adduced or 
offered by defendants to indicate that plaintiff could 
not sustain her burden of proof. Questions of fact re-
main unanswered. What ea used the hazard¥ Why 
was it not eliminated by the drain~ Should there have 
been a drain in the bathroom~ Were the defendants 
justified in leaving their premises unattended¥ Noth-
ing indicates that these questions, and others, could not 
be reasonably answered in plaintiff's favor at the trial, 
and the record indicates the availability of evidence 
which supports plaintiff's allegations. 
In the rase of Lundlil?rtJ vs. Bachman, 9 Utah 2d. 
58, 337 Pac. 2d. 433, the Court held that as against 
general allegations of negligence contained in the Com-
plaint, the facts set out in affidavits cannot be con-
strned as totally superseding the pleadings. This would 
~eem to be good law; the defendant cannot disprove 
plaintiff's allegations, and all of the necessary alle-
gations merely from affidavits where there is no oppor-
tunity for examination of the affiant, and where there 
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are other possibilities not gone into, or brought forth. 
rrhe mere fact that an affiant states that she did ex-
amine the premises within thirty minutes prior to the 
accident, and that they were perfectly normal, and that 
some unknown person came in and stuffed the toilet is 
not sufficient evidence to disprove any allegation of 
negligence or to prevent plaintiff from cross-examin-
ing as to whether or not the facts stated in the affidavit 
were in fact true. 
Thus, even if the affidavit were consistent with all the 
other evidence, it should not totally supercede the plead-
ings. But in the case at bar the affidavit is not con-
sistent either with the evidence of plaintiff or with 
the other evidence provided by the def cndants them-
selves. Two inconsistencies are apparent: First, in 
their Answer to Interrogatories defendants admit that 
there was no telephone on their premises on the day 
of the accident. The affidavit contradicts this admis-
sion, and thereby creates doubt about its credibility,. 
Second, the Deposition shows the existence of a very 
large amount of water on the floor. Defendant's affi-
davit suggests (but does not allege) that the only water 
on the floor of the premises was that which over-flowed 
from the flushing of a toilet. Other inconsistencies 
might develop where the affiant is cross-examined; and 
when conflicts and inconsistencies exist in evidence a 
jury should resolve them. As the Court stated rn 
Carter vs. Parker, 183 So. 2d. 3, (Fla. App. 1966); 
''Extreme caution should be exercised in grant-
ing Summary .J udgrnents in negligence cases, 
since the issue of negligence is ordinarily a jury 
question." 
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The law governing Summary Judgment cannot be 
that a party may, by affidavit, swear that he was not 
negligent, and by affidavit state that the opposing 
p:uty was negligent, and have the Court accept this as 
competent, binding evidence. Nor should the law govern-
ing Summary Judgments force litigants to try their 
cases by affidavit before presenting them to a jury. 
Plaintiff concludes that under the Statutes of Utah 
and under the laws pointed out in recent court decis-
ions, Judgment should be granted to Plaintiff on the 
pleadings and the case remanded to the Lower Court 
for a determination of amount of damages, or this 
failing, reversing judgment of Lower Court and re-
manding this case to the Lower Court for trial. 
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